










UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT FROM THE HUMANITARIAN MILITARY 
PERSPECTIVE 
NGETICH MAUREEN CHEPCHIRCHIR 
072409 
Submitted in partial realization of the requisites for a Bachelor's 
Degree in Law (LL.B) at Strathmore University 
Faculty of Law 
Strathmore University 
Nairobi, Kenya 
6th January 2016 
1 
Table of Contents 
Dissertation Declaration Form ............................................................................................... iv 
Abstract •.........•.•.•.••••••••.•••••.•...............••.••••••.•........................•.••...................•... .•................... v 
List of abbreviations ••••••.••••••.•.................••••••........................•••.•..••.................•...•................. vi 
List of cases ..................•......•.••••.•.•••• ......................•...•.••.•••...........•.......•...•......................... vii 
Chapter 1 ........................••......•••.•.••.••.•..................•...........•..•••..•........................•.•••••••.•...•.... 8 
Background ...... ........................................................................................................ .. ..... . 8 
Purpose of the Research ......... ............................................... ...... , ............................... .. 19 
Statement of Objective ................................................................................. ....... .. ... .. .. ......... 19 
Research Question ............................... ....... ... .......... .. ... .... .... .... ....... .. ........ ... ... ... .......... ..... .... 19 
Literature Review ..................................................................... ... .. ......................................... 19 
Chapter 2 ••••••.•.................•..•..•.•..•.• .••••••.••• •••.•...................•...•...........................••...•.•..•. 29 
Theoretical Framework ... .......... ........... ..................................... ... .... , ..... ...... ... ...... ............. 29 
Research Methodology ....................................... ......... .......................................... ............ 33 
Chapter 3 ......••.....•........•........•.••••.••.•.•.••••......................•.•....•••.••....•.... .........................••..... 34 
Pre-R2P ....... .... ... ......... .. ..................... ......... ..... ........................... .. ....... ... ... .............................. ....... 34 
Post-R2P .. ................................... ... .... ......... ......... .... .... ... .......................... ...... .... ....................... ..... 39 
Chapter 4 ••••.••...•.................••.•.••......•.................•..•.........................................•..• .................. 43 
Discussion .... ........................................................................... ...... .... .... ....... ... ... ................ ....... ...... 43 
Limitations of the study 46 
Chapter 5 .•••.••......•.••..•.••................•........•.•.••••..•••••.....................................................•........ 47 
Conclusion ......... ...... ... .. ... ....... ....... ...... .. ..................... ...... .... .... ................. ..... ..... ........................... 47 
Bibliography ............................................ ............................................................................. 52 
2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Firstly, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the Almighty God for the 
good health and wellbeing that were a necessity to complete this dissertation. 
To my supervisor, Dr Luis Franceschi for his patience, and immense knowledge and 
expertise in the field of law that I chose. His guidance played an incalculable role in 
the writing of my thesis. 
To my parents, Mr and Mrs Ng'etich, for their interminable prayers, and 
encouragement. To my siblings, Vienna, Christopher, Christine and Violet who 
without their support; this dissertation would not have been seen through. 
To those who directly or indirectly have embarked on this voyage with me, I say 
thank you. 




DISSERTATION DECLARATION FORM 
I hereby declare that the work titled "Understanding the concept of the responsibility 
to protect from the humanitarian military perspective" is my original work. To the 
best of my knowledge, this dissertation does not comprise of any works set in print 
or penned by another person without suitable reference or acknowledgement being 
accorded to them. 
Name of student NGETICH MAIJREEN CHEPCHIRCHIR 
Student ID No. 072409 
Signature lG 





The aim of the research is to seek to show the contribution the concept of R2P has 
brought about in the stoppage of magnitude acts of violence and the need to 
safeguard the rights of the human populations that are susceptible to human rights 
violations. 
This research postulates an overview of the concept of R2P elucidating the reason as 
to why the notion was devised, what are the core issues in which the notion of R2P 
seeks to tackle along with demarcating the principles of the conception. It also 
stipulates the evolution of the concept of R2P as of the ICISS Report of 2001 to its 
support at the UN World Summit in 2005 and in the UN Reports. Moreover, the 
study provides some background context on some of the prevailing theoretical 
foundations. The research looks into the current status of R2P as an international 
legal concept by looking further at case studies of some of its most recent 
applications or evocations in Kenya and Libya preceded by an examination of 
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda and Kosovo in 1999 before the concept bore 
fruition. Essentially, it marks out what the research has contributed to the 
international sphere. 
The research predominantly employed a comparative research methodology as 
depicted in chapter 3 centring on analysis of the concept of R2P, the rhetoric of 
distinguished scholars in the field of international law, the UN documents that are 
available on the internet, as well as other relevant articles. 
The research concluded that what the R2P is trying to achieve is not to provide a 
mechanism to intervene in humanitarian situations but rather intervention in those 
cases in which there is a failure of the State to protect against the four mass atrocity 
crimes irrespective of how that failure has arisen. The doctrine of R2P stresses that a 
given situation where the state does not or "fails to protect" the rights of the citizens 
of the state, the international community is entitled to intervene and afford protection 
on these populations by invoking the concept of R2P in carrying out a humanitarian 
intervention. 
The main recommendation is to establish a global consensus. This is key for the 
efficacy of the conception in practice. What's in store for this conception rests in 
achieving grander consensus. 
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Chapter 1-The fruition of the concept of R2P 
This chapter postulates an overview of the conception of "Responsibility to Protect" 
(R2P)elucidating the reason as to why the notion was devised, what the core issues 
that the notion of R2P seeks to tackle as well as demarcating the principles of the 
concept. It also stipulates evolution of the concept of R2P as of the ICISS Report of 
2001 to its support at the UN World Summit in 2005 and in the UN Reports. This 
preliminary chapter is meant to provide a foundation within the field of international 
relations upon which it fosters the deeper understanding of the issues integral in the 
espousal ofR2P. 
BACKGROUND 
In the 1990s,there was an upsurge of crises touching on humanitarian issues. The 
crises included the mass displacement of people, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. 
Essentially, the world was thronged with humanitarian catastrophes. In cases of 
So~alia, the military intervention was authorised by the UN in order to afford 
protection on the vulnerable human populations. In Kosovo, intervention that was not 
authorised took place and in Rwanda there was no intervention until later on. 
Therefore, what lies beneath the discourse analysis on humanitarian intervention is 
an apparent rigidity between the pre-eminence of the concepts of international law of 
sovereignty, and non-intervention and ensuring respect and protection of 
fundamental human rights. 
Intervention that takes the fashion of a "threat or use of force" is in direct clash with 
Article 2 ( 4) of the UN Charter which requires that member states desist "from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN". 1 The international 
community recognizes that threat can be just as coercive as the use of actual force. 
The prohibition of use of force was depicted in the Corfu Channel Case ( 1949) and 
the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua 
(1986) thus it's ruminated to be ajus cogens rule. However, there are exceptions to 
this: the right under Article 51 of the UN Charter of a state to enforce the use of self-
defence, and SC's right governed under Article 42 to consent to the use of force "to 
maintain or restore international peace and security". 
1 Charter of the United Nations, 1945 <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-
i/index.html> on 18 December 2015. 
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The traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty point towards not interfering in 
the state affairs of a state by another state as encapsulated in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter which postulates that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdictions of any state or shall require the Members to submit to such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter ... . "2Under modem international law, 
sovereignty connotes "the basic international legal status of a state that is not subject, 
within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, legislative, or 
judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state or to foreign law other than public international 
law."3Quintessentially, sovereignty infers that states do not identify a superior power. 
The principle that all states are equally sovereign irrespective of proportional size or 
wealth is a foundation stone of the UN Charter.4 
The doctrine of non-intervention is outlined as "the determination by a nation to 
refrain from interfering in the affairs of other nations or those of its own political 
subdivisions". In the Nicaragua case, ICJ held, "the principle of non-intervention 
involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside 
interference ... "5 In the Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda, the court observed 
that Nicaragua "had made it clear that the principle of non-intervention prohibits a 
state to intervene directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of the 
internal opposition within a state". 6 
At first instance, states were hesitant to allude to human rights protection as a 
justification for intervening in another state. There are instances of hesitance even 
when there was repression within the target state, and subsequent massive flow of 
refugees that would have seemed to provide a ready-made justification for doing so. 
First, the Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 which resulted to the birth of 
Bangladesh; second, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978; and 
third, the Tanzania invasion of Uganda in 1979. In each of these cases, the 
intervening state felt that a claim to be acting on the basis of self-defence as spelt out 
2 UN Charter, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html> on 18 December 
2015. 
3Steinberger H, 'Sovereignty', Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law, Encyclopaedia for Public International Law, vol10, 1987 in Pelizzon A, Sovereignty Guidelines. 
4Article 2(1), UN Charter <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html> on 18 
December 2015. 
5 ICJ Reports 1986, 106, para.202. 




in Article 51 was an easier and better defence in regards to the UN Charter; "and 
there was probably also a thought that to sanctify a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention would be to store up trouble for themselves or their 'friends'." 
Intervention thus takes place "when a state interferes in the relations of other states 
without the concerns of one or both of them, or when it interferes in the domestic 
affairs of another state irrespective of the will of the latter for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual condition of things within it". Intervention is 
deemed to infringe upon the sovereignty of a state whilst dogging for "humanitarian 
objectives". The question that crops up is whether collective humanitarian 
intervention is an invasion of sovereignty or it's a preservation of human rights. The 
growth and advancement of international human rights and international 
humanitarian law is considered to have bespoken the 'old-fashioned' sovereignty 
conception. This is because it is proposed that the rights of human beings are not 
reflected on as a solely national affair anymore thus the conception of sovereignty 
can't be operated by states to screen themselves from delineating themselves from 
the responsibility of protecting the rights of the vulnerable populations. As a 
consequence, when "sovereignty comes into conflict with human rights, the latter 
must prevail". 
In 2011, there was an intervention in Libya as a subsequent of the 1973 Resolution of 
the UNSC. This was the first adoption of the R2P doctrine in a humanitarian military 
intervention. There were a number of criticisms that the intervention faced especially 
from the Western powers contending that "NATO overstretched its UNSC mandate 
by orchestrating regime change for the sake of their own national interests".7This 
was preceded by the non-intervention in Syria; Rwanda where the UNSC intervened 
too late and 800,000 were slaughtered and in Srebenica-Bosnia where thousands of 
lives were lost due to the failure by the UN to protect those lives at the UN "safe 
areas"; Kosovo where a UNSC resolution had not been passed but NATO had 
intervened anyway; this released a contentious discussion as to whether the 
intervention undermined the UNSC and whether the intervention could be justified. 
This has resulted to the cropping up of questions such as "when, how, whether and 
7 China, Russia, India and Brazil are among the most vocal critics of the Libya intervention: 'A 
Canadian Perspective' <http://ccr2o.org/?p=616>on 22 October 2015. 
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under whose authority the international community should intervene to prevent or 
stop large scale humanitarian crises". 
After the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the former SG, Kofi Annan ruminated on 
the catch-22 situation on humanitarian intervention. "On the one hand, " he asked, 
"Is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On 
the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, 
with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? "8 Annan challenged 
the international society to avoid "future Kosovos" and "future· Rwandas ". 
The events in Kosovo set off a debate about how to deal with humanitarian crisis in 
the future and thus humanitarian intervention evolved into a redefinition of 
"sovereignty as responsibility" and the "Responsibility to Protect". 
ICISS' report on Responsibility to Protect 
In 1999 and 2000 at the UNGA, Annan was dissatisfied about the answers to 
questions in regards to humanitarian intervention and appealed for "the international 
community to try to find, once. and for all, a new consensus on how to approach these 
issues. 
In an attempt to address the aforementioned questions, the Canadian government 
instituted the ICISS in 2000. The commission co-chaired by Gareth Evans and 
Mohammed Sahnoun, was assigned to:-
" ... wrestle with the whole range of questions - legal, moral, operational and 
political - rolled up in this debate, to consult with the widest possible range 
of opinion around the world, to bring back a report that would help the 
Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common ground"9 
The commission posited that states have a duty to afford protection to its citizens. This 
stems "on its interpretation of what state sovereignty is and what rights, privileges 
and responsibilities it comes with". The commission set in print the report The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2001. It was an endeavour to "set out a framework 
8Annan K, 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', 1999, 49 in Bellamy A, 'Whither the Responsibility to 
Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit'. 
9http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/syria-the-brics-must-help-enact-the-
responsibility-to-protect/ on 22 October 2015, ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, at VII. 
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for when, how and whether the international community can intervene in another 
state for human protection purposes in order to generate greater consensus and unity 
on these extremely nay saying issues". 10ICISS' report state that sovereignty of a state 
necessitates a "dual responsibility", that is, the duty to afford protection of the 
fundamental rights of its populations and protect the latter from mass killings 11 , and 
the international community also has the responsibility to ensure that the state 
protects its citizens from "suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable 
to halt or avert it, or is in fact the perpetrator ... " if the state does not, " ... the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect" 12 
As tersely stated by Badescu and Bergholm, 
The central normative tenet of R2P is that state sovereignty entails 
responsibility and, therefore, each state has a responsibility to protect its 
citizens from mass killings and other gross violations of their rights. 
However, if a state is unable or unwilling to carry out that function, the state 
abrogates its sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect devolves onto 
international actors. 13 
The ICISS report stipulated that there should be a threshold for the international 
community to afford protection on the populations of another state employing the 
channels of military intervention. This should be:-
"Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, .. . which is the product 
either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed 
state situation; or large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, 
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. "14 
The report outlines three responsibilities in the R2P conception:-
1. Responsibility to Prevent 
10 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at XI. 
11
1CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at XI. 
121CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at XI. 
13 Badescu C and Linnea B, 'The Responsibility To Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-
Down', 288, 2009 in Blackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Legal 
and Practical Perspectives on Kosovo, Libya, and Syria' Dissertations and Theses, Paper 2532, 2014. 
141CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at XII. 
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It comprises the duty to "address both the root causes and the direct causes of 
internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations.at risk." 15 
2. Responsibility to react 
When there is failure of deterrence "to resolve or contain the situation, and when a 
state is unable or unwilling to redress to situation, then interventionary measures by 
other members of the broader community of states may be required." 16 This includes 
forcible channels that are not military in nature such as "political, economic and 
judicial sanctions"; military action should be contemplated as the last resort. 
However, there must be exclusions to the concept of non-intervention in severe 
situations, for example "violence which so genuinely shock the conscience of 
mankind, or which present such a clear and present danger to international security, 
that they require coercive military intervention." 17 
3. Responsibility to rebuild 
It involves a post intervention strategy that is deemed as being of vital importance. 
Rebuilding measures vary on a case to case basis but generally inclusive of "peace 
building and/or state-building efforts". 18 
The report also proposes a six-criteria. These conditions have been tailored from the 
"Just War Theory", especially the theory's conception of jus ad bellum. The 
Commission isn't stipulating that there should be a generally consented list in the 
international scene, however, to a certain extent the criteria could try to link the 
"rhetoric and the reality". They include19:-
1. Just cause 
If an intervention needs to be considered reasonable, it should be a reaction levelled 
at stopping "large scale loss of life" or "large scale ethnic cleansing" - "actual or 
apprehended". 
n. Right intention 
151CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at XI. 
161CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 19. 
171CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 31. 
181CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 39. 
19ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 32. 
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The intervention's principal rationale should be to "halt or avert human suffering" as 
well as to afford protection to the target state's citizens who were the main reason for 
intervening in the state in the first place. 
111. Last resort 
Every methods employed which are not military in nature to stop the magnitude acts 
of violence should have been looked into markedly. It should be judicious for 
trusting that the other channels that could be employed will be inadequate. 20 
iv. Proportional means 
"The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the 
minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question."21 
v. Right authority 
The commission underscores that the UNSC should each time be the chief source of 
approval or power to authorize for both a military and non-military intervention 
when the international community is faced with a humanitarian crisis. The 
commission also outlines· two other possible sources in situations where the UNSC 
cannot come into consensus; they include: the UNGA and "regional organizations" 
such as NATO and the AU. The UNGA's 'United for Peace' procedure of 1950 was 
set up to tackle cases where the UNSC, due to an impasse amongst the members of 
the permanent five (P5) is unsuccessful to "exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. "22This necessitates" a two-thirds 
majority" in the GA and, if invoked, would be a source of authority for conducting 
an intervention even though the PS failed to reach an agreement. 
v1. Reasonable prospects for success 
It implies that if there is no definite protection, or if the aftermath of the intervention 
prevails over the advantages, that is, if the intervention has a higher probability to 
create more negative effects than non-intervention, it is not reasonable thus should 
not be supported. 
The purpose of the commission by laying down the conditions is to:-
20
1CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 36. 
21
1CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 37. 
221CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 53. 
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" .. . strengthen the order of the states by providing for clear guidelines to 
guide concerted international action in those exceptional circumstances when 
violence within a state menaces all peoples, it is not to license aggression 
with fine words, or to provide strong states with new rationales for doubtful 
strategic designs."23 
The Report concluded by encouraging the international community to welcome the 
notion of R2P as a basic element in the code of global citizenship and it continued: 
"Meeting this challenge is more than a matter of aspiration. It is a vital 
necessity. Nothing has done more harm to our shared ideal that we are all 
equal in worth and dignity, and that the earth is our common home, than the 
inability of the community of states to prevent genocide, massacre and ethnic 
cleansing. If we believe that all human beings are equally entitled to be 
protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all, then we must match 
rhetoric with reality, principle with practice. We cannot be content with 
reports and declarations. We must be prepared to act. We won't be able to 
live with ourselves ifwe do not." 
The principal mission of the report by the ICISS to create "global and international 
consensus" has yet to happen. This is vital for the legality and validity therefore the 
efficacy of the conception in practice. The key to the future of this conception lies in 
ensuring and creating grander consensus. 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
From the time when the ICISS made available the report to the public, R2P has been 
"widely cited, endorsed, criticised, and amended". As both Pattison24and 
Hehir25draw attention to, there are certain principal dissimilarities between the ICISS 
report and the Outcome Document at the 2005 World Summit in New York. Firstly, 
while the ICISS doctrine postulates that R2Ptakes a shift "from the state to the 
international community" in events where the state is "unable or unwilling" to afford 
protection to its populations, the Outcome Document changed it to situations where 
231CISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, at 35. 
24Pattison J, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 14, in Heinze E, 'Humanitarian Intervention, the Responsibility 
to Protect, and Confused Legitimacy' . 
25Hehir A, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, .New York, 2010, 118-




the target state is "manifestly failing" thus setting an advanced level for intervening 
in the state. Secondly, the ICISS' R2P conception postulates that intervention that is 
military in nature will meet the "just cause threshold" in cases of "serious and 
irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur," which is 
inclusive of "large-scale loss of life" or "large-scale ethnic cleansing," while the 
Outcome Document limits this to events of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity. Thirdly, the ICISS' R2Pconceptionposits that the 
international community has a responsibility to intervene in situations where there is 
failure by the state in question, while the Outcome Document posits that the 
international community requires to "be prepared" to intervene on a "case-by-case 
basis". Finally, the ICISS' R2Pconceptiontakes into consideration that intervention 
without the authorization by the SC (unilateral intervention)_ is allowed in severe 
situations, while the Outcome Document calls for the involvement of the 
authorization by the SC (collective intervention) before undertaking to employany 
act of coercion. The sense of PS members not employing their veto power in such 
cases was done away with. 
The Outcome Document was inclusive of two paragraphs; · 138 and 139 which 
cogently endorsed the concept of R2P. The paragraph 139 postulate that the only 
source of authorization comes from the UNSC and obligates the international 
community to "capacity-building measures" to assist those States "which are under 
stress before crises and conflicts break out" and Paragraph 13 8 implies sovereignty 
not only has a right but also a responsibility. The international community should 
help states exercise this responsibility and support the UN in establishing an early 
warning capacity. Both paragraphs stipulates the "mass killings" and "large scale 
loss of lives" to four "mass atrocity crimes". 26 
The UN Reports 
26
UN General Assembly, World Summit 2005, Outcome Document, para. 138 and 139 
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The R2P as expressed in the Outcome Document was further restated in 2009 at the 
GA debate and in the UNSC in 2006 and 2009. It is safe to assume that the concept 
of R2P is in principal consensus as it shows in the Outcome Document. 
Annan and his Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, also 
expanded the concept of R2P in the report UN Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect, 2009. In this report, R2P concept was split into three pillars:-
• Pillar one is the "enduring responsibility of the state to protect its 
populations . . . from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, and from the incitements."27 
• Pillar two is the duty of the international community to aid the states to meet 
their responsibilities. 
• Pillar three is the "responsibility of member states to respond collectively in a 
timely and decisive manner when state is manifestly failing to provide such 
protection. "28 
Moreover, UN SG, Ban Ki-moon has enthusiastically endorsed R2P by setting in 
print a number of reports inclusive of 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
2009', 'Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, 2010' which 
suggested methods to enhance the capability of the UN to utilise on hand "early 
warning information" efficiently and also to enhance responses where there was the 
possibility of the occurrence of the four mass atrocities, and 'The Role of Regional 
and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
2011'. 
R2P as a norm in International Law 
R2P is not a legitimate conception; it does not generate any legal modifications as it 
is entrenched in the current international legal order. R2P is best understood as a 
reaffirmation and codification of already existing norms. Norms can be 
comprehended as "collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors."29 
Norms involve a characteristic of"oughtness", thus infringing legitimized norms that 
27 UN Implementing the Responsibility to protect, 2009: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symboi=A/63/677 on 22 October 2015 
28UN Implementing the Responsibility to protect, 9 
29 Morris J, 'Libya and Syria : R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum, International Affairs', 
2013, at 1266 
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have been collectively agreed upon can bring about "counteraction that will make it 
costly or ineffective" to do so.30 
R2P is also a political concept having political effects. R2P has "significantly 
changed the grammar of political discourse with regard to the prevention and 
reaction to human rights violations" changing the political dialogue from the 
justification of interventions to halt or avert atrocities, to probing "why there has 
been no intervention". This provides for legitimate intervention for humanitarian 
cases via the UN therefore making it difficult for UNSC members to provide for 
justification of the use ofveto.31 
The point that R2P doesn't involve obligations or requirements that are legal in 
nature for states to react to the mass atrocities has resulted to criticisms that R2P is 
nothing more than a "high-sounding rhetoric", resounding what Otto von Bismarck 
said: "When a man says he approves of something in principle, it means he hasn't the 
slightest intention of carrying it out in practice." 
To make R2P more operative, there should be a slow process in building consensus 
on a global and international scale. The non-existence of an ingrained international 
norm of intervention is therefore a hurdle to the international community taking 
action in due time to the humanitarian crises. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
This research critically deals with the concept of R2P as a justification for 
intervention. This is in view of the fact that there have arisen issues in this sector 
leading to an upsurge of considerable controversy in international legal discourse on 
the disregard of the international principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and self-
determination. 
A literature review is conducted to show the practical and conceptual issues inherent 
in the framework of the R2P. The norm is then applied to the cases of Rwanda, 
Kosovo, Kenya, and Libya to assess its effect in practice and determine its origins. 
The analysis of these case studies leads to a number of conclusions regarding its 
effectiveness and future application. 
30 Morris J, 'Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum, International Affairs', 
1266 
31Payandeh, M. 'With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking' Yale Journal of International Law(2010), 471. 
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PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research seeks to provide an understanding of the concept of R2P from the 
humanitarian military perspective. 
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE 
To show the contribution that the concept of R2P has made to preventing the 
occurrence of mass atrocities and affording protection to the fundamental rights of 
the citizens of the state in question. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
What contribution has the concept of R2P made to preventing the occurrence of mass 
atrocities and affording protection to the fundamental rights of the citizens of the 
state in question? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sovereignty is not an absolute term. As Luis Franceschi points out, Maritain clarified 
the etymological construction of sovereignty, Maritain says: 
"Just as words 'civitas' are oftern translated by state (through the most 
appropriate name is commonwealth or body politic, not state). So the words 
'principatus' and 'suprem potestas' are often translated by 'sovereignty', the 
words 'princeps' (ruler) by 'sovereign'. This is a misleading translation, 
which muddles the issue from the start. 'Principatus' (principality) and 
'suprema potestas' (supreme power) simply means the highest ruling 
authority, not 'sovereignty' as has been conceived since the moment when 
this word made its first appearance in the vocabulary of political theory. 
Conversely, 'sovereignty' was rendered at that moment by 'majestas' in 
Latin ... " Sovereignty, therefore, means: "First, a right to supreme 
independence and supreme power. Second, a right to an independence and a · 
power which in their proper sphere are supreme 'absolutely' or 
'transcedently', not 'comparatively' or as a 'topmost part' in the whole"32 
Franceschi adds, "the 'Political Society' has a right to autonomy. It confers the right 
upon the State so that it may be exercised in an orderly and consistent manner. This 
autonomy allows the organs of the State to function without internal or external 
interference, which means that the State governs itself with relative supreme 




independence33 However, the State is not and has never been really 'sovereign' in the 
strict meaning of this word. This was the mistaken fiction maneuvered by Rousseau 
of transposing the absolute and transcendent power of the medieval king as God's 
agent on to the so called Volante Generate, a myth that would seem to gather the 
people into one separate, absolute and transcendent power, a power over themselves, 
as a multitude ofindividuals."34 
Maritain concludes that: "Rousseau, who was not a democrat,35 injected in nascent 
modem democracies a notion of Sovereignty which was destructive of democracy, 
and pointed toward the totalitarian State; because, instead of getting clear of the 
separate and transcendent power of the absolute kings, he carried, on the contrary, 
that spurious power of the absolute kings to the point of an un-heard of absolutism, 
in order to make a present of it to the people." So it is necessary [according to 
Rousseau] that "each citizen should be perfect independence of the others, and 
excessively dependent on the State ... for it is only the power of the State which 
makes the freedom of its members".36 
Ever since, sovereignty continues to be mistranslated as suma potestas or imperio. 
On a public hearing conducted by the ICJ on March 91h, 2009, the counsel for Costa 
Rica, Prof Crawford, stated that 
"The right of free navigation appears as a qualification of the sovereignty of 
Nicaragua and is introducd by the term 'pero ' (but). Thus a particular right of 
Costa Rica is presented as a qualification of the general grant of rights (in the 
form title (dominic) and sovereignty ('sumo imperio ') to Nicaragua." 37 
33We refer to it as "relative' vis-a-vis 'absolute", the State is subject to the political society and to 
other international bodies as may be agreed for the proper dispensation of justice or the guarantee 
of certain rights. 
34Franceschi L, 'The African human rights judicial system: A proposal for streamlining structures and 
domestication mechanisms viewed from the foreign affairs power perspective' Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Navarre, 2012, 37 & 38 
35Rousseau J, The Social Contract, Book Ill, chapter IV, 160, In fact, Rousseau wrote that "if there 
were a nation of gods, it would be governed democratically. So perfect a government is unsuited to 
men." Cited by Maritain, J, 'The Concept of Sovereignty', in Stankiewicz J (ed), In Defense of 
Sovereignty, OUP, New York, 1969, 57. 
36Maritain J, 'The concept of sovereignty' 57 
3710, case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights {Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua), Public sitting held on Monday 9 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palce, presided by 
Justice Owada, at 9. (Verbatim Record) cited by Franceschi, L., xxxxxxxx 
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Alex Bellamy appeals to Hobbes' argument to demonstrate that this sovereignty 
concept isn' t anything new; Hobbes averred that if the state could not carry out its 
duty of protecting its citizens that it was authorised to do, then it doesn' t meet the 
condition for it to be known as a sovereign thus is not "owed obedience".38 This is 
extraordinarily comparable to the notion that the failure by the state in question to 
afford protection to its populations is a failure in the exercise of sovereignty. 
However, the "Lotus Principle" posits cogently that "sovereignty is not absolute; 
states have the right to only do anything which is not prohibited by international 
law".39 
The duties of sovereignty were drawn out towards protecting the citizens as governed 
under the UN Charter in Articles 1(3) and 55 , which Annan contends that the Charter 
was not "a licence for governments to trample on human rights and human 
dignity".4°Furthermore, R2P as articulated at the World Summit applies to the four 
crimes which include genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity,41 which are all not allowed in accordance to the international law and are 
. 42 
JUS cogens norms. 
One of the first champions of non-intervention was John Stuart Mill, who penned in 
his 1859 essay A Few Words on Non-Intervention: 
"There seems to be no little need that the whole doctrine of the non-
interference with foreign nations should be reconsidered, if it can be said to 
have as yet been considered as a really moral question at all. .. To go to war 
for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not defensive, is as criminal as to go to 
war for territory or revenue; for it is as little justifiable to force our ideas on 
other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other respect. But 
there assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, without having 
been ourselves attacked, or threatened with attack; and it is very important 
that nations should make up their minds in time, as to what these cases 
38 Bellamy A and Drummond C, 181, and Hobbes T/Leviathan' Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, (1991) . 
39The Case of the 5.5 "Lotus", Judgement No 9, PCIJ (1927), serA, no 10, para . 18-19. 
40 Stahn C, 'Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?' ,American Journal of 
International Law (2007), 111. 
41 World Summit Outcome Document, para. 139. 
42 Bassiouni M,lnternational Criminal Law: Volume Ill, International Enforcement, Martinus Nijhoff 




are ... To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of 
international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, 
and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error ... "43 
JS Mill argues that it is not justifiable for a foreign state to intervene in the domestic 
issues of a domestic state because it involves forcing foreign policies on the 
intervened states. He further states that there are situations in which foreign states 
must intervene. He argues that not all states are civilized. Thus, the alike 
international customs and rules of international morality cannot be applied in a 
'civilized nation' and 'barbarians' .44Today, Mill's most contentious case is "benign 
colonialism". The principles of non-intervention that he puts across are only applied 
amid "civilized" nations. "Uncivilized" persons, amid whom Mill categorizes Africa, 
Asia and Latin America, aren't suitable for the principle of non-intervention. Vitoria 
posited that it was the responsibility of "civilized states" to interfere in "backward 
states" to put a stop to callous customs, for instance, "ca11llibalism and human 
sacrifice", and focus on spreading Christianity. Groitius adjoined to Vitoria's 
benchmarks "the suppression of idolatry, atheism and sexual immorality". Mill's 
principles, therefore, can be said to be discriminatory to the so-called 'non-civilized' 
nations. This is because a state is said to have sovereignty if it has been recognized 
by other UN member states and there is equal sovereignty among all states. 
Mill brooms over the situation of intervention, saying "government which needs 
foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens, is one which ought not to 
exist." 
"When the contest is only with native rulers, and with such native strength as 
those rulers can enlist in their defense, the answer I should give to the 
question of the legitimacy of intervention is, as a general rule, No. the reason 
is, that there can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that 
intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of the people 
themselves. The only test possessing any real value, of a people's having 
become fit for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of them 
to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and danger for their 
liberation. I know all that may be said, I know it may be urged that the virtues 
43 Mill J, 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention', Libertarian Alliance, 1859, 4. 




of freemen cannot be learnt in the school of slavery, and that if a people are 
not fit for freedom, to have any chance of becoming so they must first be free. 
And this would be conclusive, if the intervention recommended would really 
give them freedom. But the evil is, that if they have not sufficient love of 
liberty to be able to wrest if from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty 
which is bestowed on them by other hands than their own, will have nothing 
real, nothing permanent. No people ever was and remained free, but because 
. d . d b "45 1t was etermme to e so ... 
Michael Walzer concedes that sovereignty and intervention eventually reset on 
consent. In situations where the populations either embrace intervention, or decline 
to oppose, "something less than, aggression has occurred".46 Fernando Tes6n gives a 
humanitarian intervention definition which excludes the · subject of consent, 
portraying it as "proportionate help, including forcible help, provided by 
governments (individually or in alliances) to individuals in another state who are 
victims of severe tyranny (denial of human rights by their own government) or 
anarchy (denial of human rights by collapse of social order)." 
Walzer further states "domestic revolutions need to be left to domestic citizens". 
Interventions that aim to realise "domestic revolutions" are probably in the passage 
of time will proof to be unsuccessful thus trigger "more harm than they 
eliminate".47However, Walzer contends that humanitarian intervention is considered 
to be reasonable in times of reacting to "acts that shock the conscience of 
mankind"48 . John Vincent, as did Walzer, in an essay published in the year of his 
death was in agreement with Walzer when he postulated: 
"Offences against human rights are a matter of international concern, but they 
do not trigger intervention except perhaps when outrageous conduct shocks 
the conscience of mankind" 
Kenneth Roth also provides a definition, "military intervention without the consent 
of the government whose territory is being invaded" is not justifiable, however, h 
45 Mill J, 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention', 6. 
46Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (2"d ed), Basic 
Books, New York, 1985 . 
47 Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 
48 Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (3'd ed), Basic 
Books, New York, 1992, 107. 
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elimits this by positing that "the imperative of stopping ongoing or imminent mass . 
slaughter might justify the risk to life." 
The trepidation of this is that intervention could raise an impossible task to 
sovereignty that would prevent people from deciding "their own political destiny".49 
Sean Murphy contends that the SC has a legitimate justification to intervene or 
authorize intervention in a state to afford protection to the populations from 
pervasive lack of"internationally recognized human rights". 5° 
Based on the above sentiments by the scholars, humanitarian intervention can be said 
to be justified when the human rights are violated by the state or government. Human 
rights lie at the epicentre of international law thus these rights ought to be protected. 
Where the state fails to do so, the international community has a duty and a right to 
intervene. 
However, there are those who are not for the idea such as .Ero and Long51 who 
contend that there has not been any agreement either in scholarly opinion" or state 
practice on a legitimate entitlement to intervene; only that the UN has shown itself 
willing to take enforcement action in the last resort to assist victims of a 
humanitarian emergency where there is no existing government or when the existing 
government refused to consent to UN action despite the scale of emergency. 
However, one can argue that intervention which is military in nature and based on 
humanitarian purposes authorised by the UN throughout the recent years indicate that 
the international community is starting to agree to such interventions because the 
acknowledgement of fundamental rights of human beings is currently an issue of 
international concern. Moreover, the former SG of the UN has suggested that where 
crimes against humanity are being committed and the employment of peaceful 
49 Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 86-90. 
50 Murphy 5, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996, 287-288. 
51 Ero, Comfort and Long 5, Humanitarian Intervention :A new role for the United Nations?, 
International Peacekeeping 2, 1995, 153, in Simons P, 'Humanitarian Intervention : A Review of 
Literature' available at http://ploughshares.ca/pl publications/humanitarian-intervention-a-review-





methods to discourage them are expended, the SC has the responsibility based on 
morality to step in on behalf of the international community. 52 · 
The roots of the concept of humanitarian intervention by other states in state is 
tracked down to Hugo Grotius' essay in the 16th Century. 53 Grotius averred that 
other foreign states could intervene in a "target state" where the latter is involved in 
"repression of its citizens", and who offering "resistance to such repression". 54 
Roth and Tes6n agree on certain principles of humanitarian intervention that justify 
legitimate humanitarian intervention. Roth categorizes such guidelines into five that 
determine whether intervention from the military perspective can be pigeonholed as 
humanitarian. First, resorting to the employment of military channels should be "the 
last reasonable option."55 Second, the key drive of the intervention should 
"necessarily be humanitarian".56 Third, the intervention should be done by way of 
utmost "respect for international humanitarian law and human rights". Fourth, it 
should "not cause more harm than good", and finally, the intervention "should 
ideally, though not necessarily be endorsed by the UNSC or another body with 
significant multilateral authority."57 Tes6n conversely also stipulates five guidelines; 
firstly, ending lawlessness or oppression should be the objective in which justifiable 
intervention is aimed at.58 Secondly, the "doctrine of double effect" - "the 
permissibility of causing serious harm as a side effect of promoting some good end, 
coupled with an adequate theory of costs and benefits"59- presides over humanitarian 
intervention. Thirdly, it is only the grave situations of oppression that necessitate the 
need for humanitarian intervention.60 Fourthly, the intervention should be accepted 
by the vulnerable populates as earlier mentioned,61 and finally, "humanitarian 
intervention should preferably receive the approval or support of the community of 
52 'Annan K: We The Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 2151 Century', Millenium Report 
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2000, para. 219, 
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ on 5 January, 2016 
53 Quinn D, 'The Responsibility to Protect' M.A. thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2007, 6. 
54 Quinn D, 'The Responsibility to Protect' M.A. thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2007, 6. 
55 Roth K, 'Was the War in Iraq a Humanitarian lntervention?'Journal of Military Ethics 5 (2006), 85 . 
56 Roth K, 'Was the War in Iraq a Humanitarian Intervention?', 85. 
57 Roth K, 'Was the War in Iraq a Humanitarian Intervention?', 85-86. 
58 Tes6n, Fernando R. 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq' Ethics and International Affairs 19 (2005), 2. 
59 Tes6n, Fernando R. 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq', 2-3 
60Tes6n, Fernando R. 'Ending Tyranny in lraq',3 
61Tes6n, Fernando R. 'Ending Tyranny in lraq,3 
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democratic states. "62The two writers hold opposing views on the specific guidelines 
to justify humanitarian intervention. Therefore, it will be difficult to unearth a 
comparable meaning of humanitarian intervention, this is because the principles 
guiding it will probably coincide. 
The concept of R2P attempts to give a criteria in which to intervene in another state. 
The criteria is set to act as a threshold in carrying out humanitarian intervention. 
However, since the introduction of the doctrine of R2P, it has faced a lot of 
scepticism. Numerous academics posit R2P of being just another watch word 
exercised by Western states to "justify self-interested interventions in their continued 
bid to propagate liberal ideals and maintain the international st~tus quo".63 
The evaluation of R2P necessitates a dialogue of how norms develop in international 
law from a theoretical and practical perspective. Some of the most significant 
milestones for analyzing the growth of R2P as a norm are Rwanda as a case study, 
NATO in Kosovo, the ICISS Document, and the Summit Outcome Document in 
2005. The ultimate object of a norm in international law is to regulate state 
behaviour64• The objective here is to evaluate the extent to which, if at all, R2P 
regulates state behaviour and in what way. 
Alex Bellamy terms a norm as "shared expectations of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity"65 . In the R2P context, the shared expectation is that 
states should take the responsibility to protect the populations from gross violations 
of human right abuses and if not, the international community will come in and fulfil 
this responsibility. The actors with a given identity are member-states of the United 
Nations by definition. 
Bellamy further states the indeterminate nature of the second and third pillars of R2P 
subside its "compliance-pull," thereby shared expectations (governments and 
62Tes6n, Fernando R. 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq', 3 
63 'Chomsky N, Statement by Professor Noam Chomsky to the United Nations General Assembly 
Thematic Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect', 2009 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/ on 5, January 2016, Murray R & Hehir A, 
'Intervention in the Emerging Multipolar System : Why the R2P will miss the Unipolar Moment', 2011. 
64 Vranes E, 'The Definition of 'Norm Conflict' in International Law and Legal Theory' (2006) 
65 Bellamy A and Reike R, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law', 2010, in Bellamy A, 
Davies Sand Glanville L(eds), The Responsibility to Protect and International Law, Martin us Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 160, in Blackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: 




international organizations will exercise this responsibility; they recognize a duty and 
right to do so; and that failure to act will attract criticism. from the society of 
states).66There are no rules for the execution of the second and third pillars, thus 
making enforcement vague, effectively clouding the determination of its normative 
power to influence behaviour. 
Brunnee and Toope67 state that norms are accepted through social practice, shared 
understandings, obedience to certain conditions of legitimacy,.and the ability of the 
norm to meet legal requirements. 68In essence, legal norms arise when shared 
normative understandings evolve to meet the criteria of legality, and become 
embedded in the practice of legality. Brunnee and Toope direct their analysis towards 
the R2P and ultimately conclude that the norm falls short on the legality criteria of 
"generality, clarity, consistency, and constancy over time," and "inconsistent 
practice"69 . This conclusion ricochets Bellamy's assertion that the second and third 
pillars ofR2P suffer from the problem of indeterminacy. 
In his study of the assumed legal nature of R2P, Ekkehard Strauss writes, "no new 
collective legal obligation has been created by R2P. Instead, the responsibility offers 
an opportunity to improve the implementation of existing legal norms"70 Strauss 
states that while R2P may not be asserting a new international norm it may provide a 
mechanism by which we may more effectively carry out and enforce the existing 
norms. However, the Commission believes they have found a norm - that is, the 
norm that states are not allowed to do whatever they please to and with their 
66Bellamy A and Reike R, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law', in Bellamy, Davies and 
Glanville,'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law', 161 in Blackford W, 'The 
Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Legal and Practical Perspectives on Kosovo, 
Libya, and Syria' Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2532, 2014. 
67 Brunnee, Jutta and Toope S, 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building 
Legality?', 2010, inin Bellamy, Davies and Glanville, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International 
Law', in Blackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Legal and Practical 
Perspectives on Kosovo, Libya, and Syria' Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2532, 2014. 
68Biackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Legal and Practical 
Perspectives on Kosovo, Libya, and Syria' Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2532, 2014. 
69 Brunnee, Jutta and Toope S, 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality?' 
inBellamy, Davies and Glanville, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law', 79,inBiackford 
W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Legal and Practical Perspectives on 
Kosovo, Libya, and Syria' Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2532, 2014. 
70 Strauss E, 'A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush- On the Assumed Legal Nature of the 
Responsibility to Protect', 2010, in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville, 'The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law', 25, in Blackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, 





populations whilst hiding behind the shield of sovereignty. This norm is evidenced 
by the various Conventions and Protocols that certain acts when perpetrated by states 
trigger certain erga omnes obligations. William Blackford is in disagreement when 
he states that the Commission has merely offered suggestions and opinions; and 
further states that their assertion of the normative status of. this responsibility is 
premature. This is because the international community has shown some hesitation in 
accepting the R2P as an international legal norm which is reflected in the language of 
Resolutions and manner of discussion surrounding military actions and humanitarian 
. . ld "d 71 mterventwns wor w1 e. 
There are portions of the ICISS report that have found a measure of widespread 
acceptance, such as the concept that sovereignty does not entail absolute power to do 
as one wishes. How R2P is applied in present and future cases, and how it develops 
in the UN will go a long way towards revealing this development over time. The UN 
has a legitimating influence on policies and norms. Barnett and Finnemore claim, 
"[UN action] can legitimate policies [ .. . ] create and diffuse international norms, 
policies, and models of political organization around the globe"72 . 
The R2P clause in the Outcome Document has also gotten varied responses amongst 
observers. Some, for instance, Todd Lindberg, regarded it as a "revolution in 
consciousness in international affairs", thus departing in the relationship between 
sovereignty and human rights. 73In accordance to Lindberg, there was a replacement 
of the state with individual persons as the focus of protection by offering states a 
duty to advocate and defend fundamental rights of human beings. Others, such as 
Michael Byers contended that the World Summit insipid the R2P concept to a degree 
that it wouldn't, in actual fact, protect vulnerable populations and could even restrain 
the SC's capability to react resolutely to "man-made humanitarian disasters".74 
71Biackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Legal and Practical 
Perspectives on Kosovo, Libya, and Syria' Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2532, 2014. 
72 'Barnett, Michael and Finnemore M, Political Approaches, in The Oxford Handbook on the United 
Nations, Daws Sand Weiss T (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2009, 2 
http://www.oxfo rdhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560103.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199560103-e-003 on December 15, 2015. 
73 'Lindberg T, 'Protect the People', in Bellamy A' Whither the Responsibility to Protect? 
Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit'. 
74 Byers M, High Ground Lost on UN's Responsibility to Protect, Winnipeg Free Press, September 18, 
2005, B3, in Bellamy A 'Whitherthe Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 




Before going further into the discussion of the concept of R2P, it is necessary to 
provide some background context on some of the prevailing theoretical foundations. 
This exposition will help ground the proceeding examination and analysis in Chapter 
3. This chapter is meant to provide a brief but as comprehensive as possible overview 
of the logic central to some theories in order to give context to the R2P discussion. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Thomas Aquinas developed the just war ethic theory which "restrains, directs and 
guides the use of armed force in international relations". This normative theory 
developed in the Middle Ages by Aquinas, Hugo Groitus, Francisco Suarez, Samuel 
Pufendorf, Christian Wollf, Emerich de Vattel and Francisco de Vitoria was intended 
to manage "the ethic of war". 75 The Just War theory was originally developed to 
restrain the devastation of strife between two conflicting forces by "enabling moral 
judgment in wartime"76, and was infrequently used on interventions done on 
humanitarian grounds. However, because John Stuart Mill and Hugo Grotius 
questioned "the unchallenged norm of non-intervention among post-Westphalian 
states"77 , interventions, purportedly in reaction to gross infringements of human 
rights by sovereign states against their populations, have become a recurren tepisode, 
particularly sin~e the conclusion ofthe Cold War. 
The three-set criteria set out by Aquinas should be employed jointly. Aquinas 
contended that "three things are necessary" for a war to be deemed just: 78 
The first is "authority of the sovereign, by whose command the war is to be waged." 
The 'authority of the sovereign' means that decisions to wage war are upon those 
who are legally authorized to do so, since, as Aquinas put it," ... the care of the 
common weal is committed to those who are in authority."79 Therefore, it is "their 
business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom, or province subject to 
75Viotti P and Kauppi M, 'International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism; Globalism, and Beyond' 
(3rd ed), Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1999, 400-401. 
76 Orend B, A Sweeping History of Just War Theory, in The Morality of War, Peterbrough, Broadview, 
2006, 10, in 'Wise L, 'Was NATO's Intervention in Kosovo in 1999 'Just'?' http://www.e-
ir.info/2013/06/21/was-natos-intervention-in-kosovo-in-1999-just/ on December 15, 2015. 
77 Wheeler N, Saving Strangers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 45, in 'Wise L, 'Was NATO's 
Intervention in Kosovo in 1999 'Just'?' http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/21/was-natos-intervention-in-
kosovo-in-1999-just/ on December 15, 2015. 
78Aquinas T, Summa Theo/ogiae, 11-11, Question 40, of War. 
79 Aquinas T, Summa Theologiae, 11-11, Question 40, of War. 
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them", and thus, "it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword of war in 
defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil 
doers ... , so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of the war in 
defending the common weal against external enemies".80It's encapsulated in the 
sovereignty and non-intervention principles. He continued to cite Augustine, 
asserting "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the 
power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the 
supreme authority"81 In accordance to Aquinas, this power arose eventually from 
God, who provided legitimacy and moral sanction for its execution.82 Today, the 
ultimate authority of those in superior positions, lies in particular institutions and 
persons, and that legitimacy is no longer derived from God's will, it is subject to both 
national and international laws that manifest the people's will, and states 
respectively. The SC, is the one provided with the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security83 ; it has the legitimate authority to 
make war decisions on behalf of the states. 84 
However, the SC can't claim the legitimate authority to make war decisions whilst 
staying within Aquinas' just war doctrine, as the necessity of the legitimate authority 
restrains the entitlement to make such decisions to sovereign, political entities 
namely, states.85 This is conflict with, both international law reality and moral 
prudence that command that UN war decisions in the mode of authorization by the 
SC under Chapter VII of the Charter are highly desirable, if not necessary, for that it 
provides war with legitimacy and moral sanction for its execution. 86Where there is 
the non-existence of the authorization of the SC, any war waged excluding that of 
self-defence is to be rendered illegal and unjust, which could be claimed on the basis 
of Aquinas' theoretical standpoint, notwithstanding. 
80 Aquinas T, Summa Theologiae, 11-11, Question 40, of War. 
81 Aquinas T, Summa Theologiae, 11-11, Question 40, of War. 
82Tooke J, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius, S.P.C.K, London, 1965, 21-22. 
83Article 24 (1), Charter of the United Nations. 
84Johnson J, 'The Just War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention' in Ficarotta J(ed), The Leader's 
lmperative:Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette:, 2001, 111-
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Second, a "just cause" is vital, that is, "those who attacked should be attacked 
because they deserve it on account of some fault". 87The neccesity of the "just cause 
"might include "defense of other states against acts of aggression as well as 
interventions to assist secessionist movements". 
The third is, "right intention "which is indispensable to "promoting good or avoiding 
evil". Aquinas categorises this prerequisite in two circumstances - negatively and 
positively.88 From the negative point of view, he rules out evil intentions expressed 
in Augustine's list from Contra Faustum: What is evil in war?,. and from the positive 
perspective, right intention is the purpose of establishing or restoring a disordered 
peace. 
One of the suppositions of neoclassical realism, as Hans J. Morgenthau contends is 
that "all human beings inherently seek to increase their power". 89 This brings about 
an event where statesmen struggle for power over other states, Morgenthau argues, 
"Politics is a struggle for power over men ... the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and 
demonstrating it determine the technique of political action."9° For the states to 
uphold their interests, intervention might be a possibility. Morgenthau further 
contends: 
"Intervene we must where our national interest requires it and where our 
power gives us a chance to succeed. The choice of these occasions will be 
determined .. . by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power 
available."91 
Neorealism centres on an antediluvian international structure that has no 
predominant authority that manages international politics. Kenneth Waltzcontends 
that in a self-help international system, the state's foreign policy is determined based 
on its national interests.92 States try "to preserve their interests" and to warrant their 
87 Aquinas T, Summa Theologiae, II-II, Question 40, of War 
88 'Johnson J, 'Just War, As It Was and Is' http://www.firstth ings.com/article/2005/01/just-waras-it-
was-and-is on 6 January, 2016. 
89Jackson Rand S(llrensen G, Introduction to International Relations: Theories &Approaches, 4th ed, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, 66. 
90Jackson R and S(llrensen G, Introduction to International Relations: Theories &Approaches,66. 
91Morgenthau H, To Intervene or Not to Intervene, Foreign Affairs, 1967, 103. 
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existence since in the self-help system, "no one can be relied on to do it for them.'m 
Tucker contends that "states' interests expand as they gain more power in 
international politics".94 
R2P require the international community to step in to afford protection to the 
populations of a state if the latter fails to bring to fruition their duty. Furthermore, 
the use of force as the final possible resort to stop or prevent violations of human 
rights can be justified. This resounds with the case of contemporary liberal 
internationalism. 
While the realists centres on a state as the key player, liberalism accentuates on 
individual persons and in protecting their rights. Classical liberals contend that 
human persons have "fundamental natural rights to liberty consisting in the right to 
do whatever they think fit to preserve themselves, provided they do not violate the 
equal liberty of others unless their own preservation is threatened."95Human beings 
also possess the right "to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects and 
not as objects or means only."96Liberals believe that each individual or state seeks 
personal gain, these shared interests of individuals could ·create domestic and 
international cooperation.97Thus, the surfacing of international organizations, for 
instance, the UN. 
Michael Walzer contends that humanitarian intervention from a military perspective 
could be acceptable as a last resort and as a method of protecting the vulnerable 
populations from violations of basic human rights. However, he posits that such 
intervention must not be carried without the authorization of the UNSC, rather 
multilaterally with the UNSC authorization because liberal internationalists believe 
93Waltz K, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, Inc, Illinois, 1979, 109. 
9'1-elbami S, 'Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy', Foreign Policy, Security Studies 11.3 
(2012), 161. 
95Charvet J and Kaczynska-Nay E, The Liberal Project and Human Rights: Theory and Practice of a 
New World Order,Cambridge University Press, London, 2008, 3. 
96Doyle M and Recchia S, Liberalism in International Relations, International Encyclopaedia of 
Political Science, 2011, 1434. 
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that multilateralism prevents great powers from pursuing national interests rather 
than humanitarian objectives in intervention.98 
On a utilitarian point of view, intervention is considered reasonable since it often 
saves more people than what the non-intervention will cost. ·For instance, the US 
spent the 1990s perceiving Afghanistan as a humanitarian disaster zone, but failed to 
intervene yet the former was quickly developing into "a national security nightmare, 
as a training ground of terror". 99 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research predominantly employed a comparative research methodology as 
depicted in chapter 3 centring on analysis of the concept of R2P, the rhetoric of 
distinguished scholars in the field of international law, the UN documents that are 
available on the internet, as well as other relevant articles. 
98 'Yoshida Y, 'A Theoretical Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention and R2P' http ://www.e-
ir.info/2013/01/16/from-kosovo-to-libya-theoretical-assessment-of-humanitarian-intervention-and-
the-responsibility-t o-protect/# ftn2 on 27 October 2015. 
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Chapter three of the research looks into the current status of R2P as an international 
legal concept by looking at case studies of some of its most recent applications or 
evocations in Kenya and Libya preceded by an examination of humanitarian 
intervention in Rwanda and Kosovo. 
PRE-R2P 
Rwanda and the failure to act 
Background 
Over 800,000 people were slain in the genocide that occurred in Rwanda whilst the 
international community did nothing about it. In 1988, the RPF was created that 
comprised of Hutus who were in opposition and Tutsis who were in exile. The RPF 
was a military and political group whose objective was to create a state government 
and retume migrants to Rwanda. However, conflict which was characterised by the 
use of arms between the RPF and the RGA(which was dominated by Hutus) arose. 
On 4 August 1993, the state government and the RPF signed the Arusha Accords and 
called for a UN peacekeeping force to aid with carrying out the peace agreement 
negotiated upon. 
The SC Resolution 872 100, established the UNAMIR, a peacekeeping force under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. UNAMIR had the responsibilities to:-
• establish a secure environment for a transitional government and planned 
elections; 
• monitor compliance with the Arusha Accords; and 
• co-ordinate humanitarian activities; inter alia. 
However, it was beleaguered by problems -lack of resources; lack of collaboration 
from the partakers, markedly in the struggle to create "a transitional government". 
On 6 April 1994, a day following the SC's decision to extend the mandate of 
UNAMIR101 , the then Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were assassinated. As a 
consequence, Tutsis and the opposition were killed by the RGA and Interahamwe. 
Armed conflicts continued between the RPF and RGA. 





The first response of the SC was to trim down the size of UNAMIR in late April 
1994. 102 As circumstances became increasingly grave, the SC acted, establishing 
UNAMIR II and, afterward, permitting the French-led Operation Turquoise103 . 
Humanitarian affairs became the concern thus was a justification for international 
intervention. Boutros-Ghali concluded this humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a 
matter of growing anguish in Africa and the rest of the world and demands urgent 
action by the international community. 104 
The SG provided an exigency plan for UNAMIR II, on 13 May 1994; this was in 
reaction to the SC request to provide an effective plan which involved the UN. 
However, the international response to the request for military personnel was 
underwhelming, that is, no major powers came forward to support the operation and 
none of 19 governments that had troop standby arrangements with the UN agreed to 
participate. The SG suggested to the SC that it takes the proposal from France to set 
out instantly troops under Chapter VII to deal with the humanitarian crisis until a 
handover could be affected with UNAMIR II. The SC reacted bypassing resolution 
929 105 . Its semantics was subject to humanitarian concerns. In authorizing Operation 
Turquoise, the SC was allowing a military intervention based upon humanitarian 
grounds. 
Why the lack of action? 
• The UN did not understand or least understood the nature of the conflict in 
Rwanda; 
• UN was badly formed to gather and communicate information onthe 
violations of basic human rights; 
• JEEAR report: Apart from France, the major powers on the SC were 
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• After Somalia, there was no enthusiasm among the SC members to jeopardize 
their troops in yet another civil war. 
The reluctance of the international community to consign troops to aid in Rwanda 
due to the lack of cogent national interests shows how far there is to go in 
establishing a general principle or practice of humanitarian intervention. This case 
study emphasised the prerequisite of intervention. The statement made by Special 
Advisor to the UN SG, Edward Luck, "standing by in the face of unfolding mass 
atrocities" is not "morally or politically acceptable". Annan posed the question-
"but: if, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide {in Rwanda], a 
coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but 
did not receive prompt Council authorisation, should such a coalition have stood 
aside and allowed the horror to unfold?" 
This case study focuses on the conflicting nature of international lawthus, a legal 
framework for states, regional bodies, and international organisations on the concept 
of R2P should be formed. 
NATO Intervention in Kosovo 
NATO who intervened in 1999 without the UNSC authorization in Kosovo was nit-
picked by developing nations, who claimed that NATO intervened to pursue its own 
interests rather than humanitarian objectives. This reopened the debate on 
humanitarian intervention. This intervention elucidates why the concept of realism is 
more suitable in explaining their driving force. 
Background 
In 1989, the then President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic refused to recognize the 
sovereignty of Kosovo, which had been recognized under Yugoslavia's 1974 
constitution. 106 As a consequence, Kosovar-Albanians created their own government 
and also operated a sequence of non-violent protests against the Serbian government. 
However, their efforts did not bear any fruit as the KLA carried out organized attacks 
against Yugoslav police in 1997. Later on, the conducted ethnic cleansing against 
Kosovar-Albanians. The UNSC was unsuccessful in authorizing the use of force to 





halt ethnic cleansing since Russia was against that idea. 107In 1998, although the 
Council in Resolution 1199108requested a cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav 
forces, the Serbs continued on. In consequential, in October, NATO threatened 
Serbia with air strikes thus forcing Milosevic to agree to permit the return of 
refugees. On March 18, further peace talks in Paris failed following the Serbian 
delegation refusing to sign a deal requesting for Kosovo autonomy and the 
deployment of NATO troops to implement the agreement. On March 24, NATO air 
were launched on the Serbian forces. 
Intervention- Justified? 
• NATO was not only unsuccessful in stopping ethnic cleansing, but also 
pushed Milosevic to intensify the scale of ethnic cleansing. 109 
• About 500-1,000 civilians died due to the bombings by NATO. 
• "NATO destroyed socioeconomic infrastructure in Serbia including bridges, 
factories, television stations, media facilities, power plant sites, and even 
some historic monuments. Moreover, NATO destroy~d water facilities as 
well as military targets". 
• There was an increment in the Kosovar Serb refugees.110Therefore, the 
NATO air campaign created more harm than good. 
• "Russia, India and China opposed the bombing on the grounds that NATO 
breached core UN Charter principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and the 
non-use of force." 
• The act of attacking without the UNSC authorization is not right since it may 
set dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion. 
Analysis 
In accordance to Alex Bellamy and Nicholas Wheeler, NATO had as a minimum the 
following reasons for the intervention: 111 
107Evans G, 'From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect', Wisconsin 
International Law Journal24.3, 2006, 706 http ://www.e-i r.info/2013/01/16/from-kosovo-to-libya-
theoretical-assessment-of-humanitarian-intervent ion-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/. 
108 UNSC S/RES/1199 (1998) The observance of ceasefire by the Albanian and Yugoslav parties in 
Kosovo. 
109Stegner G, American Humanitarian Intervention: How National Interests, Domestic and 
International Factors, and Historical Milieu' Shape U.S. Intervention Policy," Maca lester College, 
2008, 88 <http:/ /digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/17> 
110Wolfson A, Humanitarian Hawks? Why Kosovo but not Kuwait, Policy Review 98, 2000, 32. 
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(I) a fear that the armies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would repeat 
atrocities that had taken place in Bosnia some years prior; 
(2) that a continued conflict in the Balkans would establish trans-boundary effects, 
and 
(3) that the conflict could spread in the region. 
Despite the lack of authorization of the UNSC, members of the NATO-led coalition 
wanted to provide justification for the intervention on reference to relevant UNSC 
resolutions. For instance, France believed that the use of force had been subliminally 
approved by resolutions112due to the occurrence of some breaches postulated in those 
resolutions. However, I concur that the UNSC did not authorize the use of force as 
well as not condemn it. 113 
Therefore, even though the Kosovo intervention may be seen as successful from an 
operational point of view, it was not successful from a humanitarian point of view. 
The liCK declared the NATO bombings "illegal but legitimate." 114 
The liCK finish off their chapter on International Law and Humanitarian 
Intervention by delineating a number of threshold principles for the use of force 
without the UNSC authorization. They state that there are two valid triggers, "severe 
violations of international human rights or humanitarian law on a sustained basis," 
and "the subjection of a civilian society to great suffering and risk due to the failure 
of their state to protect them". 115They also stipulate that the key objective of a 
humanitarian intervention should be, "direct protection of the victimized population," 
and that the operation must have reasonable chances of success, i.e. the operation 
must contribute directly to ending the crisis and be able to do so without incurring 
further unnecessary harm to civilian populations116• The Commission goes on to state 
a number of contextual principles that include serious attempts at solutions falling 
short of military intervention, strict adherence to the laws of war, inter alia. In short, 
111 Bellamy A and Wheeler N, 'Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics',.S16 in Zimmerman D, 
'Why is the Practice of Humanitarian Intervention so Controversial?', 2014. 
1121n particular UNSC S/RES/1199 (1998), SCOR 53rd Year 13 and UNSC S/RES/1203 (1998) SCOR 53rd 
Year 15. 
113Lowe V and Tzanakopoulos A, 'Humanitarian Intervention', para. 19. 
114 Independent International Commission on Kosovo (liCK), Kosovo Report, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
115 liCK, Kosovo Report Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 193. 
116 liCK, Kosovo Report Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 194. 
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the Commission outlines most ofthe principles that end up comprising the content of 
the R2P. 
The NATO intervention, exposed the limitations of the modem international law on 
the balance between the rights of individual persons and the autonomy of the 
nations. 117 The evolution of R2P is an attempt to respond to and address these 
problems. 
POST-R2P 
Adoption of R2P in Kenya 
Background 
As a result of the presidential elections in December 2007 in Kenya, there was an 
eruption of widespread violence which resulted to the death of 1500 people and the 
displacement of 300,000. The Report from the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Fact-finding Mission found the violence to be spontaneous, organised 
and retaliatory and which it was suggested would give rise to major humanitarian 
needs. 118 At an SC meeting in February 2008, the then president of Kenya, Mwai 
Kibaki welcomed the political power-sharing agreement that had been reached to 
resolve the crisis and requested those responsible for the acts "to be brought to 
justice". 
In November 2009, the then ICC Prosecutor, Oreno Ocampo requested authorisation 
to investigate into the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 as governed under 
Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute (an own initiative investigation) and in March 
2010, the ICC's Pre-trial Chamber II authorised such an investigation spanning the 
period June 2005, when Kenya became party to the Rome Statute, to November 
2009, when the prosecutor filed his request. 119 The investigation would examine 
whether crimes against humanity had been committed during this period. 
117 liCK, Kosovo Report Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 297. 
118 United Nations Document S/PV.5845. S/PRST/2008/4 
119 ICC-01/09, http ://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf on 10 December 2015, The names 
of the individuals had been forwarded to the ICC as a result of a domestic Commission set up to 
examine the post-election violence (known as the Waki Commission after its chair) and the failed 
attempts by the Kenyan authorities to establish a special domestic tribunal to prosecute the crimes 
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Analysis 
For the persons or school of thoughts who presumed R2P to only govern an 
intervention that is military in nature, Kenya proved that the employment of"]non-
coercive tools, such as mediation could aid in halting mass atrocities when invoked 
before hand, with sufficient resources and support from the international community. 
Annan noted that he 
"saw the crisis in the R2P prism with a Kenyan government unable to contain 
the situation or protect its people. I knew that if the international community 
did not intervene, things would go hopelessly wrong. The problem is when we 
say 'intervention ', people think military, when in fact that's the last resort. 
Kenya is a successful example of R2P at work"120 
NATO Intervention in Libya 
This case study is the NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011. It looks into 
certain interests of intervening states and shows once again that the theory of realism 
is preferable to the liberalist theory. It also observes whether there have been 
modifications since Kosovo, and finishes off by showing that the influence of R2P is 
restrained. 
Background 
In February 2011 , civilians carried out political protests challenging the Libyan 
leader Muammar Gaddafi's 41-year reign. As a result, the civilians were the focus of 
mass atrocities at the hands of government armed forces. The international 
community and regional organizations responded to afford protection to the citizens 
through a range of economic, political, and military measures. 
Following attacks against the civilians, the UNSC, in the same year, unanimously 
employed the resolution 1970121 , making due reference to R2P concept. Abhorring 
what it termed as "the gross and systematic violation of human rights", the SC 
insisted on an end to the atrocities being committed by the Libyan government, 
recalling the Libyan authorities' the duty to afford protection to its citizens, 
committed. The report is available at http :l/kenyastockholm.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/the-waki-
report.pdf on 10December 2015. 
120 Bellamy A, 'The Responsibility to Protect- Five Years On', 154. 




furthermore, it-also invoked a series of international sanctions. The Council referred 
the case to the ICC . 
In resolution 1973 122, adopted also in the same year, the SC ordered an instant 
"ceasefire" which was inclusive of ending attacks against the populations that may 
comprise of "crimes against humanity." The Council gave power to state members to 
take "all necessary measures" to afford protection on its populations. 
Thus it is cogent that the employment of the two resolutions was in accordance with 
R2P. Moreover, when it came to preventing acts of violence it was a success, with 
Ban Ki-Moon postulating in his 2012 report that "tens of thousands of lives were 
saved". 
The international community is enforcing the Responsibility to Rebuild via the 
UNSMIL which is tasked to give the Libyan authorities strategic support and 
technical advice to help its transition into a liberal democracy. UNSMIL has had an 
impact, as the representative of Libya to the UN labelling its advice as indispensable 
to rebuilding Libya. These positive thoughts are echoed in the SG's report on 
UNSMIL 123, which demonstrate that it has been advocating for the Libyan Ministry 
of Justice "to ensure that all detainees are held within the legal framework and are 
given a fair trial, and giving technical support for reactivating Libya' s 
judiciary". 124In addition, UNSMIL has aided Libya in attracting investors and has 
been working in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning to enhance Libya's 
infrastructure. 125 
Background 
Libya represented the first military intervention under R2P and its application was a 
success as it made the UNSC act in a decisive manner and hastily putting in 
consideration the requirements of the concept of R2P. Moreover the use of R2P has 
established positive consequences as many citizens were salvaged. 
Alex Bellamy is one who cites the Libyan intervention as a positive example of R2P 
enforcement. He writes, "the signs from Libya suggest that the establishment of 
122 UNSC S/RES/1973 (2011) The legal basis of military intervention in Libya. 
123 S/2012/675 (2012). 
124 S/2012/675, 5-6. 
125 S/2012/675, 10-11. 
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modest early-warning, assessment, and convening capacities can have a positive 
effect on policy planning and decision-making"126. Bellamy's assessment of the 
Libyan intervention shows what R2P is potentially capable of achieving in a positive 
way. Bin Halal and Schwarz127note that the decisively multilateral character of the 
intervention made it very successful with respect to the development of the R2P 
norm. Thomas Weiss believes that R2P in Libya has the opportunity to strengthen 
the norm, and that since 2005 normative trends on the invocation of R2P and 
humanitarian intervention seem to be growing in favour ofthose norms or policies.128 
Libya represents a case wherein humanitarian catastrophe was foreseen and averted, 
or at the very least rapidly stopped, by direct, multilateral action through the UN. The 
operation was carried out swiftly and with purpose. 
126 Bellamy A, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, Ethics and 
International Affairs 25, 2011, no. 3 at 264, in Blackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law: Moral, Legal and Practical Perspectives on Kosovo, Libya, and Syria' Dissertations 
and Theses, Paper 2532, 2014. 
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approaches, Columbia University Press, New York, in Blackford W, 'The Responsibility to Protect and 
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and Theses, Paper 2532, 2014. 
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This chapter attempts to review the findings in the wider context of the literature and 
the theoretical foundations . Basically, it shows what the research has contributed to 
the international sphere. Moreover, it also shows the appreciation of the limitation of 
the study and how it could affect the validity or usefulness of the findings. 
DISCUSSION 
As aforementioned in chapter one, what lies beneath the humanitarian intervention 
dialogue is a perceptible rigidity between safeguarding the basic human rights and 
the pre-eminence of the concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention that are 
painstakingly essential elements in the preservation of peace and security. 
The principle of sovereignty traditionally entailed the ultimate authority held by an 
institution from which there is no appeal. Scholars such as Rousseau, Hobbes and 
Bellamy believed that sovereignty is supreme authority or power held by the state 
and another state could not infringe on that because it would be violating the 
principle. They believed that the rights of the populations came from the state having 
authority. If the state did not have authority then it should not be considered a state 
thus no obedience is owed to it. This brought forth obstacles to the possibility of 
activating humanitarian means, including military operations to' prevent human rights 
catastrophes. However, since the birth of the concept of R2P, the concept of 
sovereignty shifted to that entailing the primacy of rights of individual persons. The 
respect for rights of human beings is the core of international law. Certain primary 
achievements in this trajectory have been the "Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols on 
International Humanitarian Law in armed conflict; the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the two 1966 Covenants 
relating to civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights; and the adoption in 
1998 of the Rome Statute for the establishment of an ICC". 
The shift of the concept of sovereignty brought on a debate as to whether a foreign 
state should intervene or not. John Mill, a liberal scholar and a proponent of non-
intervention argues that it is not "justifiable to force our ideas on other people". He 
states that forcing a state(s) to submit to the will of a foreign state is not right. 
However, there are exceptions to this. In addition, one should note that Mill ' s 
argument does not apply to what he terms as the ' barbaric' or ' non-civilised' states. 
43 
He states that "the international customs and rules of international morality" applied 
to the 'civilised' states cannot be applied to the 'barbarians'. He furthers states that 
the governments which need assistance from foreign states to enforce obedience 
from its populations need not be in existence. This is because he believes that liberty 
granted by a foreign state on the target state is not permanent. Mill stipulated that 
people given freedom by another state wouldn't be able to hold on to it. He was in 
support of the principle of non-intervention because intervention undermined the 
authenticity of domestic struggles for liberty. 
Walzer is in concurrence with Mill when he states that "domestic revolutions "should 
be given to the domestic citizens; because if foreign states intervene, it would prove 
to be ineffective and more harm than good will come out of it. Walzer further states 
that sovereignty and intervention should be dependent upon consent by the majority 
of the population. If the citizens allow for an intervention to take place, then "it 
would be odd to accuse them [the interveners] of any crime at all". 129 However, he 
positions that consent will not be considered as a factor where the acts committed 
upon the vulnerable populations "shock the moral conscience of mankind". 
The concept of intervention dates back to Grotius in the 6th Century where he stated 
that a foreign state(s) could be allowed to intervene where "a target state is engaged 
in repression of its citizens, who are in tum engaged in legitimate resistance to such 
repression". There are two theories that are motivated by the works of Hugo Groitus. 
The first theory avers that "natural law authorizes all states to punish violations of 
the law of nations, irrespective where or whom the violations occur, to preserve the 
integrity of international law". The second theory posits that "states may intervene as 
temporary legal guardians for peoples who have suffered intolerable cruelties in the 
hands of their own state". 130The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has developed 
overtime having faced a number of humanitarian crisis especially during the 1990s. 
Thus, it has led to the development of R2P as a norm. However, there is a debate 
amongst scholars as to whether the concept is a norm. Some argue that for it to be 
considered a norm it should meet certain criteria and in this case, it is considered not 
to have while others argue that they have found a norm - that is, the norm that states 
129 Walzer M, 'The Moral Standing States', in Beitz C, et al, eds, International Ethics, Princeton 
university Press, Princeton, 1985, 221. 
130 'Criddle E, 'Three Groatian Theories of Humanitarian Intervention', Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
vol16(2), 2015, 473' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2630280 on 6 January, 2016. 
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are not allowed to do whatever they please to and with their populations whilst 
hiding behind the shield of sovereignty. This norm is evidenced by the various 
Conventions and Protocols that certain acts when perpetrated by states trigger certain 
erga omnes obligations. There also others who believe that R2P is not a novel norm; 
it is just an improvement of the implementation of existing legal norms. 
Thomas Aquinas who developed the 'Just War Ethic' Theory advocates that there 
should be a threshold in meeting the criteria for humanitarian intervention. It posits 
that interventions which are justifiable might not infringe upon the "principles of 
proportionality and last resort". 
From the realist scholars' point of view, the international community do not have any 
legal jurisdiction over the populations of another state or states. The focus is on the 
state as the key actor. The realism protagonists deem that moral concepts should 
neither prescribe nor circumscribe a state's behaviour; emphasis should be placed on 
state security and self-interest. However, Mill dismissed some of these arguments in 
favour of intervention to support territory or revenue in order to enhance national 
power, prestige, or profits. He argues that they lack moral significance. 
From a liberal perspective, liberals were divided into two: cosmopolitans- postulate 
the rights of "cosmopolitan freedom" are valued for everyone and thus humans have 
a duty based on morality to endsevere "violations of human rights and inhumane 
treatment of innocent people"; and communitarians (Walzer and Mill)-"limit the 
cases that justify intervention". 131For the communitarians, non-intervention offered 
protection to human dignity. This is because citizens were allowed to go about their 
lives devoid of external interference. 
From a utilitarian perspective, intervention is justified since it reduces the death toll 
in comparison to non-intervention. The proponents of utilitarianism state that when 
intervention occurs, it will lead to the halting of the human rights violations, than 
non-intervention which allows the continuation of these violations thus leading to an 
upsurge in the death toll of the populations. 
131 Doyle M, 'A Few Words on Mill, Walzer, and Nonintervention' Ethics & International Affairs, 351 
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In accordance to Gareth Evans, R2P concept has made four principal contributions to 
the humanitarian intervention debate 132:-
1. Turning the focus of the debate from humanitarian intervention to a 
responsibility to protect people trapped in conflict situations; 
2. Developing a new understanding of sovereignty where the state does not 
control but primarily protects its citizens; 
3. Setting up clear criteria of what the R2P, in practice, should mean, clarifying 
that it consists of much more than just military intervention; and 
4. Mandating that if coercive action is seen as necessary, it must be legal and 
legitimate." 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
Although this research was carefully prepared and had attained its objective, I am 
still aware of its limitations and shortcomings: 
./ Time constraint thus impeding the author in attempting to deliver a more in-
depth research. The time to investigate a research problem was pretty much 
constrained 
./ Lack of reading sources in the library in regards to the topic in question. Most 
of the sources have been adopted from the internet. 
132Evans G, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Brookings 





The final chapter draws some conclusions from the preceding analysis and suggests 
some important areas of focus for the development of R2P. Furthermore, it seeks to 
give recommendations to the issue in question. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the emergence of R2P since the ICISS Report in 2001 through the 
UN Reports to the World Summit Outcome in 2005 and the application of R2P in 
specific case studies, it is time to attempt to answer the questions which began this 
contribution. As for why there is a need of R2P and who it's there for, the paragraph 
138 of the World Summit Outcome document made it clear that the population of 
each State is being protected from four specific crimes and incitement to commit 
those crimes. R2P is limited to four crimes - genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. What the R2P is trying to achieve is not providing a 
mechanism to intervene in humanitarian situations but rather intervention in those 
cases in which there is a failure of the State to protect against these four crimes 
irrespective of how that failure has arisen. The doctrine of R2P avers that in 
situations where a state fails to protect the basic rights of its populations, the 
international community has a duty to afford protection . to these vulnerable 
populations. 
However, there are some key difficulties in shifting"R2P from theory to practice". 133 
Firstly, the issue of conceptualization. This guarantees that the latitude of the concept 
inclusive of its limitations are well understood so that there are no arisen 
misconstructions or misconceptions in the international realm; such as R2P is only 
about military intervention, and that in the cropping up of new cases, there is the 
broader consensus. This could be achieved if the norm is institutionalized. This is 
because if these interventions are to be considered legitimate in the international 
sphere then they should be done within an internationally agreed framework. 
Alex Bellamy134concludes that the R2P norm requires more advocacy and adoption 
as an official policy, which will not only reduce the likelihood of future atrocities, 
but also make potential future atrocities easier to stop if they do begin because states 
133"About the responsibility to protect" 2008 parliamentary hearing at the United Nations, New York, 
20-21 November. 
134 Bellamy A and Reike R, 'The Responsibility to Protect and International Law', 2010. 
47 
'• 
will have built up institutional and diplomatic frameworks for dealing with the 
situations. In Bellamy's view R2P will ultimately be more effective if viewed as a 
policy agenda as opposed to some kind of "red flag" meant to generate political will 
on the fly. He claims, "R2P is best employed as a diplomatic tool, or prism, to guide 
efforts to stem the tide of mass atrocities, and that it has little utility in terms of 
generating additional international political will in response to such episodes".135The 
assessment highlights the need for and potential success of a robust institutional 
framework for R2P. 
Secondly, is the challenge of institutionalism. If this difficulty is sorted then it will 
ensure that governments and intergovernmental bodies have on hand all the 
capability, be it diplomatic or military, required to ensure effective early warning and 
early action. 
Thirdly is the political issue; this ensures that in the events where there is an 
occurrence of acts of violence, there will be effective mobilization by the SC, 
governments and civil society. The lack of political will was evidenced in Rwanda 
where the SC could have prevented the crisis but failed to do so. The UN Special 
Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect held that "ultimately, of course, it is all 
about political will"136 
In addition, to the abovementioned challenges, the absence of financial and military 
resources of the UN can also be seen as a challenge. This will require support from 
the international sphere in provision of the resources. 
Recommendations 
1. Institutionalization of the norm 
A State ensures the protection of its civilian population by ensuring that the 
abovementioned crimes, and incitement to commit these crimes, are part and 
parcel of the national legal system with suitable measures being taken to ensure 
their implementation. The aim is transformative - to create a situation in which 
135 Bellamy A and Reike R, 1The Responsibility to Protect and International Law', 2010, 166. 
136 LuckE, 'The Responsibility to protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?', Ethics and International 
Affairs, vol 24, number 4, 2010, 363 in Hao R, 1Rhetoric of Responsibility: R2P's Harmful Application 
in Humanitarian Practice' http./ /www. e-i r. info/2015/02/15/ rhetoric-of-responsi bi lity-r2ps-ha rmfu 1-




respect for international humanitarian law and human rights are seen as aspects 
of the national legal system. 137 
2. Role of regional organizations 
Paragraph 138 of the Outcome document proposes that in situations where a 
nation cannot meet its duty in this sphere, then it should ask for assistance which 
does not constitute a significant infringement of state sovereignty. It should not 
only provide the assistance requested but it must also be in a position to know 
which States are failing to meet their responsibilities, hence the SG's 2010 report 
on an early warning system. Reports from the Offices of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Adviser for the Prevention of 
Genocide and the Special Adviser for R2P and fact-finding missions have 
provided important early warnings of State failure. It is the failure of the State to 
exercise its R2P that activates the responsibility of the international community. 
What has stood out in such situations has been the involvement of regional 
organisations that have not only provided assistance for capacity-building but 
also have contributed, for example through offers of good qffices, to the peaceful 
resolution of crisis situations. Such efforts were acknowledged as a possibility in 
paragraph 139 of the Outcome document in the allusion to Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter and have usually been acknowledged by the Security Council in their 
discussion of each crisis situation. 138 
From the ICISS Document, Chapter VIII acknowledges the existence and 
security role of regional and sub-regional organizations, but expressly states that 
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council", and It has long been 
acknowledged that neighbouring states acting within the framework of regional 
or sub-regional organizations are often (but not always) better placed to act than 
137 Report of the Secretary-Genera/ "Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the 
rule of law", UN Doc S/2006/980. 
138 Para. 93 of the World Summit Outcome had called for "forging predictable partnerships and 
arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations." See for example, Haugevik, K 
"Regionalising the Responsibility to Protect Possibilities, Capabilities and Actualities" NUPI Report 02-
2008 http://www .n u pi. no/Pu blikasjoner /Boeker -Ra pporter /2008/Regiona lising-the-Responsibi I ity-
to-Protect-Possibilities-Capabilities-and-Actualities on 10December 2015 and Wouters J and P de 
Man 'The Responsibility to Protect and Regional Organisations' KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global 




the UN, and Article 52 of the Charter has been interpreted as giving them 
considerable flexibility in this respect. 
The analyses conducted by Glanville, Bellamy and others of the relatively 
effective execution of an R2P intervention in Libya posit that the influence of 
regional organizations like the League of Arab States was instrumental to 
amassing the political will to act. Glanville writes, "in the absence of sovereign 
consent, this regional consent was crucial in convincing skeptical states to 
acquiesce and in generating the will among other states to push for the 
authorization of military intervention to protect civilians". 139Bellamy and 
Williams refer to these regional organizations as "gatekeepers" that frame the 
issues and define the "range of feasible international action" .140 
Another reason why the regional option is promising is that it aids to tackle the 
issues mentioned earlier that can be associated with attempting to assert universal 
moral values through cosmopolitan ideals. In regards to a report released in 2011 
by Ban Ki-Moon, Glanville notes, "The Secretary-General recognized that the 
implementation of R2P 'should respect institutional and cultural differences from 
region to region,' and he accepted that each region will operationalize the 
principle 'at its own pace and in its own way,"' and "different regions interpret 
different norms and values in different ways". The SG's 2011 report shows that 
the UN as an international body believes that respect for the values of states and 
regions is an important part of implementing any policy, especially one as 
potentially invasive as R2P. This approach may help to implement R2P in a way 
that is more sensitive to the needs and values of different communities. 
3. An ethos of prevention 
An ethos of prevention is cogently emerging as part of R2P as part of the 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to resolve situations of crisis. 
As to whether or not there is a legal obligation to take preventative measures that 
is questionable. Using the decision of the ICJ in Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro, Arbour contended that R2P imposes a legally 
enforceable duty on States to intervene in situations where the state fails to fulfil 
139 
Glanville L, In Defense of the Responsibility to Protect, 2013, 336. 
140 
Bellamy A, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, 841. 
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its duty to afford protection to its citizens. 141 Carvin has criticised Arbour's 
reasoning arguing that "Attempts to create a legal entrapment for states out of a 
hodgepodge of international treaties and newly emerging norms do not actually 
advance the cause ofR2P."142 So, there is no legal responsibility for other States 
to act in cases where the state fails to meet its legal commitment to R2P; this is 
implied in paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome document in its 
reference to collective action by the Security Council and to decisions being 
taken on a "case-by-case basis." For the international community, this means that 
the responsibility to protect is in reality a choice to protect. 
As for whether the experience of R2P indicates the emergence of customary 
international law there has been no consistency of action - compare and contrast the 
responses of the SC to the aforementioned case studies. Given the impact of these 
episodes on the future of R2P, there is a clear need to establish the principles for a 
military intervention and a mechanism to ensure respect for those principles to 
ensure long-term future ofR2P. 
The international community replied to the question posed by Annan in his 
Millennium Report and the responsibility to protect represents the new mechanism 
being created to balance sovereignty with international human rights. Perhaps the 
final words should belong to the same report which having asked the question 
continued: 143 
We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of 
humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be 
supported Alas, that does not tell us which principle should prevail when 
they are in conflict. Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught 
with political difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers. 
141The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and P.ractice, 34 Review of 
International Affairs 445, 2008. This duty was based on para. 431 of the ICJ judgment which noted: If 
the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing 
genocide, or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent, it is under a duty to make use of 
these means as the circumstances permit http://www.icj-cij .org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf 
onlODecember, 2015. 
142
A Responsibility to Reality: A reply to Louise Arbour, 36 Review of International Studies {Special 
Issue), 2010, 47, 48 in McMahon J, 'The Responsibility to Protect- Questions and Answers?', UCD 
School of Law. 
143Millennium Report of United Nations Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The role of the UN in the 
21st century, United Nations, New York, 2000, at 48. 
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